Ricardian Equivalence: An Evaluation of Theory and Evidence by B. Douglas Bernheim





Working Paper No. 2330




This paper was prepared for the second annualNBER Macro conference; a shorter
and less complete version willappear in the 1987 NBER Macroeconomics Annual.
I would like to thank Stanley Fischer for
providing the impetus for this project, in addition to various helpful comments.Aifredo Pereira and Lawrence Levin provided
invaluable research assistance. Support from theSloan Foundation is gratefully
acknowledged. The research reported here is part of theNBER's research program
in Taxation. Any opinions expressedare those of the author and not those of
the National Bureau of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #2330
July 1987
Ricardian Equivalence:
An Evaluation of Theory and Evidence
ABSTRACT
In evaluating the existing theory and evidence on Ricardian
equivalence, it is essential to distinguish between the short run
effects of government borrowing (primarily the potential forstimulating
aggregate demand) and the long run effects (primarily the potential for
depressing capital accumulation). I argue that the theoretical case for
long run neutrality is extremely weak, in that it dependsupon
improbable assumptions that are either directly or indirectly falsified
through empirical observation. In contrast, the approximate validity of
shortrun neutrality depends primarily upon assumptions that have at least an aura of plausibility.Nevertheless, even in this case behavioralevidence weighs heavily against the Ricardian view.
Efforts to measure theeconomiceffects of deficits directly
throughaggregate data confront a number of problems which, taken
together, may well be insuperable.It is therefore not at all
surprising that this evidence has, by itself, proven inconclusive.
Overall,the existing body of theory and evidence establishes a
significantlikelihood that deficits have large effects on current
consumption, and there is good reason to believe that this would drive up interest rates.In addition, I find a complete lack of either
evidenceor coherent theoretical argument to dispute the view that







Inrecent years, skyrocketting federal deficits have generated
widespread concern and fevered debate. Economists' analyses of the
deficit problem have focused primarily upon two intellectual
benchmarks. One school of thought, typically associated with Keynes,
holds that deficit financed tax cuts raise disposable income, thereby
stimulating aggregate demand. As a result, deficits lead to high real
interest rates, and crowd out private capital formation. If
disequilibrium prevails, unemployment may also fall. The second school
of thought holds that taxpayers see through the intertemporal veil, and
realize that the present discounted value of taxes depends only upon
real government spending——not on the timing of taxes. This foresight
gives rise to a "Say's law" for deficits: the demand for bonds always
rises to match government borrowing. As a result, deficits fail to
stimulate aggregate demand, and in fact have no real effects. This
second view is typically associated with Ricardo, no doubt much to his
posthuminous dismay (see O'Driscoll [1977]).
Thenotion of "Ricardian equivalence" has come to play an
important role in modern economic thought, due in large part to the work
of Earro [1974]. In evaluating the existing theory and evidence on
Ricardian equivalence, itisessential to distinguish between the short
runeffects of government borrowing (primarily the potential for
stimulating aggregate demand, and itsimplicationsfor macroeconomic
stabilization policy) and the long run effects (primarily the potential
fordepressing capital accumulation). I argue (section 2) that the—2--
theoreticalcase for long run neutrality is extremely weak, in thatit
depends upon improbable assumptions that are either directly or
indirectly falsified through empirical observation. In contrast, the
approximatevalidity of short runneutrality depends primarily upon
assumptionsthathave at least an aura of plausibility. Nevertheless,
in both cases behavioral evidence weighs heavily against the Ricardian
view (section 3).
Efforts to measure the economic effects of deficits directly
through aggregate data confront a number of problems which, taken
together, may well be insuperable (section 4). It is therefore not at
all surprising that this evidence has proven inconclusive. Studies
using aggregate time series data almost uniformly support the view that
deficits significantly stimulate aggregate demand in the short run, yet
they often fail to identify systematic short run relationships between
deficits and either interest rates, prices, or other nominal
variables. Studies besed upon international comparisons (including some
new results) find a significant relationship between deficits and
aggregate demand (section 5). Few if anystudies have attempted to
measure long runeffects directly.
Takentogether, theexistingbody of theory and evidence does not
justifyclaims that government borrowing has littleor no effect on the
economy.Rather, I conclude that there is a significant likelihood that
deficits have large effects on current consumption, and there is good
reason to believe that this would drive up interest rates. In addition,
I find a complete lack of either evidence or coherent theoretical—3—
argument to dispute the view thatsustaineddeficits significantly
depress capital accumulation in thelongrun.
2.Theoreticalconsiderations
The central Ricardian observation is that deficits merely postpone
taxes. A rational individual should be indifferent between paying $1 in
taxes today, andpaying $1 plus interest in taxes tomorrow. Since the
timingof taxes does not affect an individual's lifetime budget
constraint, it cannot alter his consumption decisions.
The relevance of this observation depends upon the length of
consumers' planning horizons. If fiscal policy postpones tax
collections until after current taxpayers have died, then it may well
alter real economic decisions (see Diamond [1965] and Blanchard
[1985]). Barro's [1974] central insight was that intergenerational
altruism may act to extend planning horizons, thereby reinstating strong
versions of Ricardian equivalence.
Recent theoretical work Ins clarified the set of implicit and
explicit assumptions upon which the Ricardian proposition depends. To
establish the equivalence of taxes and deficits, one must assume that
i) successive generations are linked by altruistically motivated
transfers, ii) capital market either are perfect, or fail in specific
ways, iii) the postponement of taxes does not redistribute resources
within generations, iv) taxes are non—distortionary, v) the use of
deficits cannot create value (i.e. through bubbles), vi) consumers are
rationaland farsighted, and vii) the availability of deficit financing—4—
asa fiscal instrument does not alter the political process.JJ In this
section, I elaborate on each of these assumptions.
2.1. LInkages between generations
Under the Ricardian world view, intra—family transfers between
members of successive generations are ubiquitous, and motivatedsolely
byaltruism. Both components of this hypothesis aretheoretically
suspect. I will take them in order.
With regard to the first component, one line of criticismargues
that,underplausible assumptions about preferences, productivity
growth,and incomedistribution, many parents will bequeath nothing to
their children (Andreoni [1986a], Feldstein [1986a], Laitner [1979]).
When this occurs, children nay well help to support theirparents, in
which case Ricardian equivalence still prevails for policies thatdonot
alter the pattern of linkages (see Carmichael [1982], or Bernheim and
Bagwell [1986] for a more general treatment). The relevant issue
therefore concerns the likelihood that transfers flow neither from
parents to children, nor from children to parents.
A number of authors have studied models which allow for bothgifts
(from child to parent) and bequests (from parent to child).Typically,
there is a range of parametrizations for which transfers flow in neither
direction (Buiter [1979], Carmichael [1982], Weil [1984], Abel [1985a],
and Kimball [1986])./ In general, I find this subliterature
unenlightening. For one thing, I question the wisdom of rejecting
certain specifications of preferences, as is thepracticeof several
authors mentioned above, on the basis of criteria such as dynamic—5—
inconsistency (between members of successive generations), or divergence
of utility streams. While consistency and convergence areanalytically
convenient properties, they are unjustifiable as primitive choice
axioms. Dynamic inconsistency is simply a manifestation of conflict
within families, and I see no reason to rule it out. Similarly,
divergence of utility streams simply limits the usefulness of utility
functions as representations of primitive preference orderings, and
cannot logically invalidate the possibility that altruism is strong.
Furthermore, this entire sub—literature considers a very special
subset of preferences, in that direct altruism is generally limited to
one's immediate successor and predecessor. If, for example, individuals
care directly both about their children and grandchildren
(u =u(c,ui,u2)),then positive bequests may prevail in
equilibrium even when capital accumulation is inefficiently high (i.e.,
on the wrong side of the golden rule——see Ray [1987]). One simply
cannotrule out thepossibility that generations are linked by applying
thissortof a priori reasoning.
A second line of criticism spins off of Bernheim and Bagwell's
[1987] observation that representative agent models abstract from
interconnections between families. They argue that ubiquitousparent—
child linkages would embed all (or nearly all) individuals in a single
interconnected network. The consumptionofeach individual would then
depend only upon total wealth, and an increment tototalwealth would be
dividedamong the entire population. Consequently, in a large dynamic
economy, any incremental bequest would be divided between the—6—
recipient's contemporaries, and the resulting increment to the
recipient's consumption would be negligable. Accordingly, the donor
would prefer to make no bequest at all. In equilibrium, many donors
would be driven to corners, so that no large interconnected network
would remain..V
A third line of criticism argues that optimal government policy
will generally entail driving successive generations to corners
(Bernheim [1986]). The reason is simple: when transfers are positive,
each donor is indifferent on the margin between his own consumption, and
thatof the corresponding recipient. If the planner cares directly
about the donor and the recipient, he must in general prefer larger
transfers——the initial configuration could not have been socially
optimal. I have noted in the above reference that one must qualify this
conclusion when the planner canprecommithimself to particular
policies.In addition, note that Ricardian equivalence may still hold
in economies where the government fails to act optimally.
I turn next to the second component of the linkage hypothesis——
that intergenerational transfers are altruistically motivated. It is
important to emphasize that Ricardian equivalence holds under all
specifications of altruism in which the utility of each individual is
determined as a function of consumption profiles: one need not require
that an altruist values only the utility of others, as in Barro [1974]
(see Bernheim and Bagwell [1986]). Various authors have suggested
alternative motivations, including uncertainty concerning length of life
(Davies[1981]), intrafamily exchange (Sussman, Cates, and Smith [1970],—7--
Becker [1974, 1981], Ben—Porath [1978], Adams [1980], Tomes [1981],
Kotlikoff and Spivak [1981], and Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers [1985]),
and tastes for generosity (Blinder [1974], Andreoni [1986b]). In
general, these alternatives do not give rise to neutrality results (see
Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers). Unfortunately, it is very difficult
to distinguish between different formulations of preferences on the
basis of theoretical reasoning alone. Nevertheless, Bernheirn, Shielfer,
andSummers make an a priori case for the presence of exchange
motives. They argue thatBarro'sdynastic specification,which portrays
families as perfectly harmonious units, is extremely restrictive, and
that moregenerally thepreferencesof distinct family members will
confliot4/
Bernheim and Bagwell [1986] offer an alternative criticism of the
Ricardianlinkage hypothesis. Building on the observation that
ubiquitous parent—child linkages would embed nearly everyone in a
single, interconnected network, they show that this hypothesis implies
the irrelevance of all redistributional policies, distortionary taxes,
and even prices. Indeed, this remains true even when some fraction of
the population makes no transfers, or is motivated by considerations
other than altruism. Since these results are untenable, they conclude
that, in some critical sense, the linkage hypothesis cannot even be
approximately valid, and that all policy prescriptions based upon the
dynastic framework are therefore suspect.
In defense of Ricardian equivalence, one might argue that the
linkagehypothesis is a more appropriate approximation in some—8—
circumstances than in others. Specifically, the Bernheim—Bagwell
results may depend on much longer chains of linkages than does the
neutrality of government borrowing, particularly if the debt will be
paid off within a few generations. If some sort of friction exists in
each link, this might dissipate the Bernheim—Bagwell effects, without
substantiallyaltering the approximate neutrality of certain deficit
policies. Yet formal analysis suggests thatthisline of defense is
flawed, and at best leads one to a different set of untenable
conclusions(Abeland Bernheim [1986])e￿i
Recently, several authors have questioned the importance of
intergenerational issues in connection with the Ricardian debate
(Poterba and Summers [1986], Hubbard and Judd [1986b]).±/ Poterba and
Summersargue that,under a variety of plausibledeficit scenarios
(includingsome historical ones), a substantial fraction of the deferred
taxburden is not shifted to future generations..Z/ On the other hand, a
substantial fraction is shifted forward——is the glass half full or half
empty? Furthermore, the current deficit experience is very atypical,
andrationalconsumers might well expect to escape liability for paying
off the lion's share of our current outstanding debt.
Both Poterba—Summers and Hubbard—Judd also point out that, because
consumers have relatively long horizons, the nsrginal propensity to
consume out of increments to wealth is small, perhaps on the order of
.05.Theyconclude that factors such as liquidity constraints and
myopia have a much larger bearing on the Ricardian debate.—9—
The validity of this conclusion depends upon the policy issue that
one hasinmind. If one is concerned with short runissues,such as
stimulationof aggregate demand within a standard Keynesian setting,
then Poterba—Summers and Hubbard—Judd are undoubtably correct (although
note that 5%ofa $200 billion deficit is $10 billion, which constitutes
a non—trivial rise in consumption).If, on theother hand, one is
concernedwith capital accumulation in the medium and long runs,
intergenerational issues play the dominant role./ Indeed, simulations
show that, under standard life cycle assumptions, plausible deficit
policies have enormous effects on medium and long run capital stocks,
even though the short run effects may be trivial or even perverse
(Auerbach and Kotlikoff [1986]).
2.2. Capital !brket Imperfections
When inefficiencies in private capital markets make it difficult
orImpossible for households toobtain loans, governmentborrowing may
have real effects (Buiterand Tobin [1981]). Hubbard and Judd [1986a,b]
emphasizethe quantitativeimportance of liquidity constraints for short
runissues. Underthe assumption that 20% of the population is
liquidity constrained, they show that a $1 deficit—for—taxes swap could
well increase current consumption by about 254. Clearly, this is far
larger than the roughly 54 rise in consumption that would follows from a
pure wealth effect. In a somewhat different vein, studies by Drazen
[1978] and Pogue and Sgontz [1977] establish that, when liquidity
constraints bind early in life, policies involving intergenerational
transfers alter human capital accumulation, even in the presence of—10--
intergenerational aitruism.2/
Unfortunately, these studies are all somewhat unsatisfactory, in
that they take liquidity constraints to be given exogenously.
Certainly, the effect of government policy will in general depend upon
the nature of the capital market failures which give rise to inefficien-
cies.
Recent work explains credit rationing as the consequence of
asymmetric information (Stiglitz and Weiss [1981], Jaffee and Russell
[1976]). These approaches generate liquidity constraints as an
endogenous aspect of equilibrium. Using such models, Hayashi. [1985] and
Yotsuzuka [1986] argue that, in many situations, liquidity constraints
adjust in response to government policies, and that the nature of this
adjustment restores Ricardian equivalancer1.2/
It is, however, apparent that the I-Iayashi—Yotsuzuka results are
highly sensitive to assumptions about the distribution of the future tax
burden. While I discuss distributional issues at greater length in the
next subsection, it is important to emphasize the particular synergy
between liquidity constraints and distribution. Accordingly, I provide
a brief analysis of Hayashi's second model, which is based upon the
Jaffee—Russell framework. I modify Hayashi's model by dropping the
assumption that the government imposes a fixed lump sum tax, and assume
instead that taxes rise with earned income.2.i/ Work effort is fixed, so
the tax is non—distortionary. I show that as long as a separating
equilibrium prevails, deficits increase the consumption of all
consumers, including those who are not liquidity constrained.—11—
Postponing taxes has real effects in this model because it allows the
government to undertake redistributions thatcouldnot be achieved
through current taxes (due to the existence of private information).
Strangelyenough, deficit policy is still irrelevant when a pooling
equilibrium prevails; indeed, endogenous adjustments neutralize
redistributions between individuals, despite the absence of altruistic
linkages.
Suppose in particular that there are two types of individuals, H
and L. Both have the same first period earned income,w1. However, in
the second period, > w. Each individual knows his type, but this is
private information. Lenders know only that the fraction p of the
population is of type L, and (1 —p)is of type H. Following
Hayashi, I assume that default results in the loss of all period 2
resources, and that the marginal utility of period 2 consumption at
=0is finite. These assumptions are for convenience only.
Suppose for the moment that lenders make no effort to distinguish
an individual's type on the basis of his desired loan. Lenders will
then be willing to loan up to w/(1 +r)to each individual at the
rate r (where r is the lenders' opportunity cost of funds). Beyond
+r),lenders will charge a rate r* on incremental loans, where
i-p
In figure 1, I have followed Hayashi by illustrating the decisions
of L and H consumers on the samediagram. L's origin is at
whileH's is at Each type's endowment point is given by E.H L
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Underthe preceding assumptions, the opportunity locus for a type H
individual is ABC.
It is now possible to illustrate both separating and pooling
equilibria. In a separating equilibrium, lenders offer twocontracts,
denoted I and S. Type L individuals would default on S (actual
consumption would then be given by J), but not on I. Given this
observation, they are indifferent between the twocontracts——weresolve
thisindifference in favor of I. Type H consumers strictly prefer
S. With this pattern of self—selection, both contracts earn zero
profits. In a pooling equilibrium, lenders offer one contract, denoted
P. Type L individualsdefault on the contract, and, as a result, it
yields zero profits. A pooling equilibrium prevails if and only if
type H individuals prefer P to S; otherwise, a separating
equilibrium prevails.
Hayashi argues as follows. Suppose that the government cuts taxes
on each individual by x, and raised them by x(1 +r)in period 2.
Then the endowment point merely shifts along the line AB. Since the
locus ABC is unchanged, both separating and pooling equilibria are
unaltered.
Now suppose thattaxesare positively relatedto earned income. A
tax cutin period 1 will affect after taxearnedincome equally for both
types. However, the attendant increase in taxes in period 2 will fall
moreheavily on typeH individuals.
Whatis the effect of this tax cut on consumption? Note that we
can decompose the policy into two components: the deferral of a fixed,—13—
lump—sumtax, and a period 2 redistribution from type H to type L
individuals. Hayashi's analysis demonstrates that the first component
has no real effects. I therefore focus on the second component.
Suppose that we reduce w by x, and raise w by x(1 —
sothat total resources are unchanged. w2 —
w2falls, so that
shifts downward to ML. They key analytic point is that ABC shifts
downward to A'B'C. To verify this, one shows that B' lies on BC.
Note that the point B' is given by the consumption vector












where zx/p, from which the desired conclusion is immediate.
Nowsuppose that a separating equilibrium prevails. Subsequent to
the redistribution, the new equilibrium is given by the contracts I'
and 5'. Since type L's endowment has risen, I' will ordinarily be to
the right of I (as long as C1 is normal), and 5' must be to the
right of S (since J' lies to the right of j). Thus, deficits raise
current consumption for both types of individuals. Intuitively, the
redistribution of second period resources to type L individuals
relaxes the incentive compatability constraint on type H individuals.—14—
Type L individuals were not liquidity constrained to begin with, and
so consume more in both periods. Type H individuals were liquidity
constrained in period 1, and so increase first period consumption as
much as possible, despite the loss of lifetime resources. In fact, one
can show that when utility is time separable, type H individuals will
increase period 1 consumption by more than the present value of lost
resources in period 2. The quantitative significance of this effect may
thereforebe quite large.
Suppose finally that a pooling equilibrium prevails. Note that as
long as the redistribution is not too large, P remains a pooling
equilibrium. Thus, redistributions between different types of
individuals in period 2 arecompletelyneutralized, despite the absence
of altruistic linkages. This result is reminiscent of Bernheim and
Bagwellts analysis (although it holds for much different reasons), and
should, consequently, generate some skepticism about neutrality results
based upon models of this type.
2.3.RedistributIon
Even if individuals are infinite lived and capital markets are
perfect, the deferral of taxes through deficits may alter the pattern of
incidence. Simply put, different people may bearalarger share of the
taxburdenat different points in time. In effect, all the real effects
of debt described so far arise from redistributions of this sort, either
between successive generations, or between separate incarnations of the
same individual in distinct periods.
A redistributlonal policy can significantly alter current—15—
aggregateconsumption only when two conditionsaresatisfied. First,
therelevant parties must not be linked through chains of altruistically
motivated transfers (I do not give to or receive from my children; I do
not save for or borrow against my future). Second, these parties must
havedifferent propensities to consume resources in thecurrentperiod
(I consume today, but my children do not, and neither do my future
incarnations). For redistributions other than those considered in sub-
sections 2.1 and 2.2 it is very easy to argue that the first condition
holds, but very difficult to establish the second in a convincing way.
As a result, there is a common presumption that, ignoring intergene-
rational issues and liquidity constraints, the distributional
consequences of postponing taxes are of second order importance.
Certain considerations suggest that debt (Abel [1986]) and social
security (Abel [1985b]) maystimulateaggregate consumption by redistri-
buting resourcestowards individuals with higher marginal propensities
toconsume. These policies also tend tofavor families with few
children, and this may affect fertility, thereby altering consumption
indirectly (Becker and Barro [1985],Wildasin[1985]).Itis, however,
difficult to guage the quantitative importance of these effects.
A separate set of issues arises when the distribution of future
taxesis not known with certainty (Buiter and Tobin [1981]). To the
extent consumers save more as a precaution against uncertainty, deficits
mayactually"crowd in" investment (Chan [1983]), although once again it
isdifficult to assess to quantitative significance of this factor. I
findthisargument implausible. If the world was otherwise Ricardian,—16—
then one would never expect to observe deficits since the electorate
would universally oppose the gratuitous introduction of uncertainty.
Rather, huge current surpluses would result from the public's desire to
resolve uncertainty as quickly as possible.
Futuretaxes nay also be uncertain because they are related to
income, which is itself random. In this case, postponement of taxes may
result in a reduction of future net income risk, thereby inducing a rise
inconsumption (Barsky, Mankiw, and Zeldes [1986]). I find this
observation unsatisfactory, in that the absence of relevant insurance
markets is never explained. Hayashi's analysis of liquidity constraints
certainly drives home the point thatitis dangerous to discuss the
effects of government policy in the presence of market failures without
modelling the failures explicitly. Indeed, in the Barsky et. al. world,
the government should intervene in insurance markets, and help to pool
risks associated with future income. Risk pooling should in no way
depend directly upon the timing of taxes. Note thatasimilar objection
also applies to the "crowding in" view, mentioned above.
2.4. Distortionary Taxation
The timing of taxes naybe quiteimportant if taxes distort
behavior, and if marginal future taxes depend upon different decisions
than marginal current taxes.i.V This observation is especially relevant
to thecurrentdiscussion when deficits are used to postpone capital
income taxes, since a reduction in marginal capital income tax rates may
cause individuals to save more, and consume less. Auerbach and Kotlikoff
[1986] argue that this effect could dominate the net wealth effect in—17—
the short run,evenin a life cycle world. The plausibility of this
outcome depends in large part on intertemporal substitution elasti-
cities. Measurementof these elasticities is a dicey problem, and well
beyond the scope of this paper. However, in evaluating the macro-
economic evidence discussed in sections 3 and 4,thereader should bear
in mind that deficits may substantially depress the longrun capital
stockeven when the short run effect is to crowd—in investment.
A more general treatment of deficit financing in a world with
distortionary taxes gives rise to the theory of tax smoothing. This
theory suggests that tax rates should be kept relatively constanteven
whenoutput fluctuates. Intuitively, since the deadweight loss of
taxationrises (approximately) with the square of the taxrate, a
constant rate minimizes the average distortion (Barro [1979], Prescott
[1977], Lucas and Stokey [1983], Kingston [1984]).i￿/ Whiletax smoothing
is an important normative concept, this theory does notappear to
generateany clear positive implications concerning the link between
deficitsand aggregate consumption.
2.5.Peraanent Postponement
Feldstein [1976] criticized Barro's analysis of fiscalpolicy by
arguingthat, whenthegrowth rateof the economy exceeds the interest
rate,the government can roll over deficits indefinitely. Asa result,
no generation need ever actually pay any portion of thepostponed
taxes. Barro [1976] responded that intergenerationallinkages might
actually prevent the economy from accumulating an inefficientlylarge
amount of capital. This exchange spawned a separate sub—literature—18—
which focused on the relationships between gifts, bequests, and capital
over—accumulation. I have already referred to many of these papers in
subsection 2.1. While I do not think one can draw any conclusions about
the form of intergenerational altruism or the pervasiveness of inter-
generational linkages from this literature, I am convinced that two
points are now well—established. First, contrary to Barro's conjecture,
intergenerational altruism does not rule out dynamically inefficient
outcomes. Indeed, for certain specifications of preferences itis
possibleto obtain inefficient equilibria with either positive gifts
(Weil [1984], Abel [1985]) or positive bequests (Ray [1987]). Second,
even when the economy over—accumulates capital, Ricardian equivalence
still holds as long as successive generations are operativelylinked
(Carmichael[1982], Bernheim andBagwell [1986]). The key to this
secondresult is that the government cannot, in the absence of other
market failures, alter the aggregate opportunity set of the private
sector through borrowing. If voluntary transfers are operative, then
individual families could mimic a policy of rolling over deficits
indefinitely by cutting the bequests (or increasing the gifts) of every
generation.141
Despitethe fact that cases of dynamic inefficiency have recieved
a large amount of attention, it is not obvious that this work is of any
practical relevance. Few if any economists today believe that the U.S.
capital stock is inefficiently large. Permanent deferral of taxes may
simply be infeasible.—19—
2.6 MyopIa
For Ricardian equivalence to hold, it is clearly essential for
consumers to be both highly rational and farsighted. While the rational
expectations hypothesis is much in vogue, one should be aware that
alternativebehavioral hypotheses have very different implications (see
e.g. Shefrin and Thaler [1985]). For example, consumers nay simply
chooseconsumption heuristically on the basis of current disposable
income, and mayfail completely to appreciate the link between current
deficits and future taxes. If so, then the more traditionalKeynesian
viewof deficits (see e.g. Blinder and Solow [1973]) is appropriate.
2.7Political Processes
Government expenditures nay depend critically upon sources of
finance. Politicians may generally support various costly programs, but
oppose current tax increases. When it is possible to run deficits,
these two positions are at least logically consistent. Thus, the
availability of deficit financing may profoundly affect the size and
composition of government (Buchanan and Wagner [1977], Bohn [1985],
Alesina and Tabellini [1987]).
Of course, it is difficult to explain such behavior on the part of
politicians without attributing appropriate views to the electorate.
One is therefore naturally led back to the issues raised in the
preceding subsections (e.g. non—neutrality in Alesina and Tabellini
[1987] results from the absence of non—distortionary taxes). It is
neverthelessimportant to bear in mind the potential endogeneity of
governmentexpenditures, and to acknowledge that thepolitical process—20—
may amplify the effects of fiscal policies.
3. IndirectEvidence
In this section, I evaluate the available empirical evidence on
several of the assumptions discussed in section 2. Section 3.1 concerns
the intergenerational linkage hypothesis; section 3.2 focuses on
liquidity constraints and myopia.
3.1 IntergenerationalTransfers
Iwill organize my discussion of the linkage hypothesis around
three questions: Are significant intergenerational transfers common?
If so, aretheyintentional? Finally, are they motivated by altruism?
U)Aresignificant intergenerational transfers common?
To begin with it is important to clarify the meaning of an
intergenerational transfer. For our purposes, feeding one's child does
not qualify. The reasons are evident: children are not generally
regarded as rational economic planners, and even if they were, they
would typically face liquidity constraints. For concreteness, consider
an individual who plans to feed and cloth his ten year old child until
age 13, at which point he expects the child to achieve full independence.
Suppose the government raises taxes on this individual, and announces
thatitwill decrease taxes commensurately on his child 30 years in the
future. If the child is a rational agent with access to perfect capital
markets, the parent could simply feed him less; the child would respond
by borrowing to cover the cost of his food, and Ricardian equivalence—21—
would hold. However, if the child is unable to form sensible economic
plans or to borrow against his future earnings, the parent has few
options: if he feeds hischildless, the child will eat less.
Consequently, the deficit policy will have real consequences. This
example establishes a general point; the Ricardian equivalence
propositionrequires the existence of operative intergenerational
linkages during a period of life in which children can form rational
economic plans, and are linked to their own futuresthrough borrowing or
saving.
Some recent evidence suggests thatintergenerationaltransfers
play avery important role in the U.S. economy. In a well—known paper,
Kotlikoff and Summers [1981] calculated historical patterns oflife
cycle saving, and concluded that standard models could account for only
one fifth of aggregate capital accumulation..!￿! They attributed the
residual stock to intergenerational transfers, and presented some direct
evidence on gifts and bequests to support this inference (see Darby
[1979] for similar findings). Modigliani [1985]has sincedisputed
these results.Unfortunately,studies of thissortcanat bestshed
lighton the aggregate size of gifts and bequests, and provide no clue
as to the fraction of the population engaged in such transfers.
Surprisingly, it is very difficult to obtain good microeconomic
evidence on gifts and bequests. Data on gifts seem particularly poor.
Analysis of many data sets, such as the Retirement History Survey,
suggest that intravivos transfers torelatives and children living
outsidethe home arequitesmall, ranging from $39to$60 on average,—22—
depending upon the sample year (Hurd [1986a]).Thissuggests thatgifts
are highly concentrated among the very wealthy (who, no doubt,
significantly undereport the size of their transfers). In contrast,
Kurz [1984] reports thatapproximately18% of a sample drawn from a
surveyconducted by the President's Commission on Pension Policy
received gifts averaging more than $2000, while 16% made them (tie did
not report the degree of overlap between these groups). Since the PCPP
survey collected extremely detailed and dissaggregated information about
transfers, it any well provide more reliable data. Nevertheless, Kurz's
findings may exagerate the importance of intra vivos transfers, for two
reasons. First, an unknown fraction of the observed transfers were
intragenerational (e.g. between brothers).i&/ Second, the PCPP survey
classified all persons above the age of 18 as distinct family units,
even if they lived with their parents; unmarried children were
designated "single head families." Since Kurz reports that more than
75% of those receiving transfers were single head families, these
results any in fact be consistent with those based on other surveys. To
the extent one believes that children over 18 living at home tend to be
liquidity constrained, one is led to the conclusion that intra vivos
transfers generally play a small role indetermining the effects of
fiscalpolicies.
Direct data ontransfers at death are available through estate tax
returns and probate records. Unfortunately, these data sources only
contain information on sufficiently wealthy testators, and therefore
cannot be used to draw inferences about the distribution of bequests for—23—
theentire population.
One can, however, in principle recover the distribution of
bequests by examining age—wealth profiles, and rates of resource
depletion after retirement. Early studies, including those using
interview surveys of saving (Lydall [1955], Projector [1968], Mulanaphy
[1974]), cross—section surveys of assets (Lydall [1955], Projector and
Weiss [1966], Smith [1975], Mirer [1979], and King and Dicks—Mireaux
[1982]), and estatedata(Atkinson [1971], Atkinson and Harrison [1978],
Brittain [1978], Shorrocks [1975] and Menchik and David [1983]) have
with relatively few exceptions found that wealth does not decline
significantly, and perhaps even slightly increases, after retirement.
Elsewhere (Bernheim [1987a]), I have criticized these studies, and have
argued that one requires panel data to resolve these issues properly.
All recent studies employing panel data (Bernheim [1987a], Diamond and
Hausman [1984], and Hurd [1986a]) conclude thatassetholdings decline
significantlyafter retirement (by perhaps 30% over a ten year
period). While this pattern is suggestive of life cycle motives, the
avenge individual nevertheless still expects to neke a substantial
bequest.
The dispersion of bequests is also quite important. Diamond and
Hausman [1984] and King and Dicks—Mireaux [1982] both find thata
substantialfraction of individuals (roughly 20%) reach retirement with
essentially no property or financial resources. In evaluating these
findings, it is essential to bear in mind that survey responses to
questions about assets are notoriously unreliable. For example, Ferber—24—
et.al.[1969] described the results of a validationstudy, which
revealed that individuals undereport assets by as muchas 50%.
Furthermore, one would naturally expect enormous variance in the
reliability of responses within any sample. Bernheim [1987b]reports
some evidence that corroborates this conjecture. Specifically, he finds
that if one follows the same individual through successivewaves of the
Retirement History Survey, reported pension and/or socialsecurity
income varies by 50%ormore in consecutive years for a disturbingly
large fraction of the total population, and it is not uncommon to find
individuals who report no pension and/or social security income at all
between two survey years in which they reported positive benefits.It
is therefore very difficult to distinguish low asset holdings at
retirementfrom measurement error.
(ii)Are bequests intentional?
A number of authors have attempted to distinguish between
intentional and accidental bequests (i.e. those caused byuncertainty
concerning length of life, coupled with failure of annuity nnrkets)
through detailed analysis of age—wealth profiles. Both Blinder, Gordon,
and Wise [1980] and Hurd [198Gb] estimate optimizing models of asset
accumulation using data drawn from the Retirement History Survey. Their
findings are extremely sensitive to functional specification. Blinder,
Gordon, and Wise's estimates of bequest motive parameters are
essentially uninformative. Hurd finds no evidence toindicate the
presence of a bequestmotive, but this conclusion may be driven by his—25-.
specification of utility, wtich is linear in bequests. Quasi—linearity
impliesthatthe marginalpropensity to bequeath out of lifetime
resources is zeroupto some threshold, beyond which it jumps
discontinuously to unity (thisistrueregardless of parameter
values). As a result, iftheactualmarginal propensity is closer to
zerothan to unity, one might well expect to fit a very high threshold
value, or equivalently, a very small bequest motive.
Bernheim [1987a] argued thatone must be verycareful about
interpretting age—wealth profiles when individuals hold a substantial
fractionof their assets as annuities (social security,pensions).
Previousauthors had suggested that the inclusion of annuities would
accentuate the hump—shaped age—wealth profile, since the actuarial value
of survival contingent claims falls with age (Mirer [19793). Indeed,
Dicks—Mireaux and King [1984] found evidence of "a clear life—cycle
pattern" when the actuarial value of annuity claims was included in
measuresof net worth. Bernhejm pointed out thatactuarial valuation is
inappropriateif one wishes to judge the plausibility of life cycle
motives, and showed instead thatthe simplediscounted value of future
benefits (ignoring the possibility of death) is ordinarily a good
approximationto the relevantnotion of annuity value. His analysis
reversedthe findings of Dicks—Mireaux and King: the proper inclusion
of annuities generates wealth profiles that decline very little if at
all after retirement. Apparently, this point is not yet well
appreciated (see e.g. Modigliani [1986]).
Bernheim also examined the response of rates of asset decumulation—26-.
to changes in levels of annuitization. Theory predicts that annuities
should accelerate decumulation under the life cycle hypothesis, and slow
it in the presence of bequest motives. The evidence supports the latter
pattern, but not overwhelmingly.
Hurd [1986a] examined differences between the age—wealth profiles
of individuals with and without children, and found that those with
children tend to dissave slightly more rapidly than those without
children (unfortunately, his test of the hypothesis of equality between
the dissaving rates for these groups is nonparametric and does not yield
a confidence interval on thedifference,so thatonecannot judge the
powerof his tests against interesting alternatives). He views this as
a contradiction of the bequest motive hypothesis. It is, however,
consistentwith two—way altruism. A parent ay dissave less rapidly
becausehecares for his child. However, part of his saving is also
precautionary. He will reduce this component if he believes hischild
will provide for him an an emergency. Theneteffect is ambiguous.
Hammermesh and Menchik [1986] show thatbequestsare positively
related to expected longevity, and negatively related to unexpected
longevity. They view the first pattern as indicative of a bequest
motive: increased longivity raises lifetime resources, and bequests are
presumably normal. However, this conclusion does not follow if
increased longevity does not imply a proportionate rise in earnings
potential. The observed pattern could also be consistent with life
cycle motives if greater longevity is associated with greater
uncertainty.—27—
A second strategy for distinguishing between intentional and
unintentional bequests is to examine the relationship between observed
bequests and the characteristics of recipients. In the absence of a
bequestmotive, recipient characteristics should have no discernable
effects. Using probate data, Tomes [1981] finds that bequests are
inversely related to the resources of children; he interprets this as
evidence in favor of a bequest motive. However, this pattern is also
consistent with the view that parents with wealthier children have less
of a precautionary motive for saving, since they can count on their
childreninemergencies. Since emergencies might actually arise
infrequently, the typical family might stillmakeno intergenerational
transfers. In addition, Menchik [1984] has raisedserious questions
aboutthe reliability of Tomes' data. One should also bear in mind the
unrepresentative nature of probate samples.
A third strategy is to evaluate evidence concerning attitudes
towards various forms of insurance. Life cycle consumers should be
anxious to annuitize their resources, even at relatively unfair rates
(Yaari [1965]). Nevertheless, there seems to be a general resistance to
annuitization (Bernheim, Shielfer, and Summers [1985]). Friedman and
Warshawsky [1985a, 1985b] document the availability of annuities on
private markets, and conclude that one must posit a bequest motive to
explain portfolio choices and patterns of accumulation. They do not,
however, consider precautionary motives arising from fear of large
unplanned expenses, such as medical costs. These can create a
reluctance to annuitize, and would explain higher levels of accumulation—28—
(see Kotlikoff [1986b] for some simulation results).
One can, however, distinguish between precautionary and bequest
motives by examining behavioral responses to changes in the level of
annuity provision. If a bequest motive is present, consumers canundo
annuities by purchasing life insurance. This is not the case if
resistanceto annuities arises from the fear of large unplanned
expenses. Bernheim [1985] analyzes a cross—section of elderly
individualsdrawn from the Retirement History Survey, and concludes that
increased levels of annuitization do in fact stimulate life insurance
purchases. This provides strong support for the hypothesis that a large
fractionof elderly individuals intend to leave bequests.
(iii)Are bequests altruistically motivated?
Bernheim, Schleifer, and Summers [1985] (BSS) provide evidence
linking the behavior of children (parental visits) to the bequeathable
assets of parents. This relationship is particularly strong when
parents are in poor health, and holds in families with twoormore
children, but not in single child families. This last observation is
particularly important, since the single/multiple child distinction is
predicted by the BSSmodelof strategic bequests, but not by Becker's
[1974, 1981] formulation of the altruistic motive. Furthermore, this
distinction deflects nany methodological criticisms: unless one
believes that there is a spurious behavioral difference between single
and multiple child families, it is difficult to offer another
explanation of this result.—29—
Cox [1987] and Kurz [1984] both provide evidence on intra vjvos
transfers that reinforces the BSS conclusion. Cox finds that, while the
probability of receiving a transfer falls with the recipient's income,
themagnitudeof transfers conditional upon receipt rises. The first
finding is consistent both with exchange and altruistic motives.
However, the second is strictly inconsistent with altruism. The
exchange theory yields an ambiguous prediction, since a rise in the
recipients income increases the price of his services, and since
bequestsmeasure expenditures on services, rather than quantity. An
additional implication of the altruistic model is that theconsumption
of each family member should depend only upon the family's total wealth,
so that a redistribution of wealth between a donor and the corresponding
recipient will be completely offset by private transfers. Kurz tests
this proposition by looking separately at the effects of donors' and
recipients' wealth on transfers. His results are strongly inconsistent
with the prediction outlined above. Unfortunately, both studies are
based upon the PCPP survey, which does not contain information on the
characteristics of both donors and recipients for any single
observation. This creates an important omittedvariables problem, since
parental characteristics (such as wealth) are undoubtably correlated
withthoseof their children, and certainly influence the magnitude of
transfers. Cox makes some correctionsforthis potential bias, and
finds that hisresults are essentially unaffected.
Independent corroborationoftheexchange—motive hypothesis is
provided by survey responses to direct questions about parental motives—30—
(Sussman, Cates,andSmith [1970], Horioka[1983]).In addition, this
modelcan better account for consumers' evident reluctance to give
gifts, despite significant tax advantages (Shoup [1966], Cooper [1979],
ESS; see also Adams [1978] for an opposing viewpoint, and BSS, p. 1071,
footnote 25 for a response).
Menchik, Irvine, and Jianakoplos [1986] find some evidence thatis
bothconsistent with the altruistic motive, and inconsistent with one
important formulation of the exchange motive (Kotlikoff and Spivak's
[1981] "family as an annuity" hypothesis). Using data from the National
Longitudinal Survey, they show that parental expression of anintent to
bequeath is almost completely uncorrelated with the perception that
children would provide aupport during periods of financial hardship.
Note in addition that Bernheim's [1985] finding concerning life
insurance purchases (discussed above) is also inconsistent with the
"familyas anannuity" hypothesis: when forced to hold high levels of
annuities, a life cycle consumer would never undo this by purchasing
lifeinsurance, only to undo his life insurance purchase by entering
into an annuity agreement with his family members. However, the results
of these studies are compatible with the more general model of exchange
described by BSS.
Somesupport for the altruism model can L found in an important
paper by Tomes [1981], which I have already mentioned in another
connection. However, his central finding——that bequests are negatively
relatedto recipients' resources——is easily reconciled with the exchange
hypothesis (recall Cox's observation thattheexchange modelyields an—31—
ambiguous prediction concerning the effect of recipients' resources on
transfers; it is, however, somewhat puzzling that Cox and Tomes obtain
coefficients of opposite signs in studies of, respectively, intra vivos
transfers and bequests). While Tomes does directly reject a link
between bequests and the behavior of one's children, he does not adjust
for many sources of potential bias, as do BSS.
Both models of intergenerational transfers are inconsistent with
Menchik's [1980, 1984] finding that testators tend to divide bequests
equally between their children. This observation is somewhat troubling,
since it suggests that we do not yet fully understand bequest motives.
However, its importance is generally exaggerated. Suppose for example
that equal division simply reflects an egalitarian constraint
superimposed upon other motives by social norms. If consumers are
otherwise altruistic, Ricardian equivalence will still hold (Abel and
Bernheiin [1986]). Furthermore, parents could still manipulate their
children subject to the constraint that they divide transfers equally in
equilibrium (since a sizable minority of testators do not follow the
equal division rule, it seems likely that social norms do not proscribe
penalizing a miscreant offspring). Accordingly, Menchik's finding is
notparticularly telling in thecurrentcontext.
Ihavenow discussed evidence concerning each of three components
oftheintergenerational linkage hypothesis. Taken as a whole, this
hypothesis has an additional, directly testable implication: economic
activity should be independent of the distribution of resources across
generations. Boskin and Kotlikoff [1985] test this directly with—32—
aggregate time series data, and find thattheage distribution of
resources matters a great deal. However, their study suffers from many
of the problems encountered in other time series investigations (see
section 4).Inaddition, their procedure is unusually dependent upon
assumptionsabout preferences and uncertainty, in that they extrapolate
consumption profiles, and then attempt to explain the difference between
actualand predicted consumption. The behavioral assumptions underlying
their calculations are very strong, and of questionable validity (see
e.g. Starrett [1986] for a discussion of isoelastic, intertemporally
separable utility functions).
Overall, bequests seem to be significant for a large segment of
the population. In addition, much microeconomic evidence is
inconsistent with traditional life cycle models. One can explain some,
but not all of this evidence by appealing to risk aversion concerning
lengthof life and unplanned expenses. Indeed, data on life insurance
holdings point directly to a bequest motive. However, much evidence
indicatesthat bequests are not motivated solely by altruism. In
contrast, no existing evidence successfully isolates the altruistic
motive. I conclude that a substantial minority of individuals probably
make little or no intentional transfers,and thatmost other individuals
aremotivatedby a variety of factors.
3.2LiguicLity constraints andtyopia
Thereis now a large literature which tests various implications
of the joint hypotheses thatconsumers maximize intertemporal utility,
andcapital markets function efuicently. Much of this literature builds—33--
upon Halits [1978] stochastic permanent income hypothesis. Following
Hall, many investigators have estimated consumption Euler equations to
test orthogonality conditions (i.e. innovations in consumption should be
unrelated to lagged information). Others have supplemented Hall's model
with a process describing the evolution of income, and estimated
multiple equation systems to determine whether consumption is
excessively sensitive to income innovations (see Sargent [1978] and
Flavin [1981]). In the interests of conserving space, I refer the
reader to two excellent surveys of this literature by King [1983] and
Hayashi [1985]. Despite numerous problems with estimation and
interpretation, the evidence on talance supports the view thatasizable
minority (roughly 20%) of individuals fail to behave in a way that is
consistent with unconstrained intertemporal optimization. Unfortunately,
these studies do not identify the constrained group (does it consists of
one set of irrational individuals, or do liquidity constraints tend to
bind at some particular point in the life cycle?), nor do they allow us
to determine the persistence of liquidity constrained states. Both
issues are extremely important in the current context.
At this point, it is appropriate to mention a number of studies
which use microeconomic data to measure the relationship between asset
accumulation and the present value of anticipated social security
benefits (Feldstein and Pellechio [1979], Kotlikoff [1979], Blinder,
Gordon, and Wise [1980], Diamond and Hausman 11984], Kurz [1981, 1984],
Dicks—Mireaux and King [1984]). There seems to be a weak consensus
within the profession that social security partially displaces personal—34—
saving,by perhaps twenty to forty cents on the dollar. It is important
to understand that this isnota direct test of Ricardian equivalence,
sinceit tellsus nothing about aggregate saving. Indeed, If capital
marketsare perfectand successive generations arelinked by
altruisticallymotivated transfers, then family members should be
entirely indifferent about who (parents or children) does the saving...1Z/
Accordingly, one cannot test the full Ricardian hypothesis without
information about the wealth of all relevant family members.
Nevertheless, If we reject the intergenerational linkage
hypothesis on the basis of other information, then these studies do
provide valid tests of life cycle planning models, in thattheyallow us
to determine whether the postponement of income affects current
consumption..iJ Viewed in this light, the evidence points to significant
liquidity constraints or myopia over long planning periods. There are,
of course, other explanations for these findings. Social security may
be an imperfect substitute for other assets. Heroic assumptions about
expected social security benefits may be quite wide of the mark
(although see Bernheirn [1987b]). Finally, mispecification of the social
security wealth variable may create large downward biases in estimates
of wealth displacement (Bernheim {1987c}).
4.DirectEvidence: Aggregate Time Series
i now turn my attention to studies which attempt tomeasure the
effectsof deficits directly from aggregate time series data. In
subsection 4.1, I discuss some general problems which, taken together,—35—
maywellbe insuperable. Subsections 4.2 arid 4.3 concern studies of
real variables (especially consumption) and nominal variables
(especially interest rates), respectively. Subsection 4.4 summarizes.
4.1• Generalproblems
It is useful to begin this discussion by summarizing eight common
problems shared by virtually all studies which use macro time series
data to measure the effects of deficits.
First, measurement of debts and deficits is problemmatic (see
Eisner and Pieper [1984, 1986], Eisner [1986], and Boskin [1982,
1986]). Measurement issues include: inflation adjustments, adjustments
from partomarket values, properly accounting for government assets and
investments as well as for contingent liabilities, and valuing
liabilities from social insurance programs. Many of these issues pose
thorny conceptual problems, so that the "right" measure is not obvious
(Kotlikoff j1986b]). Furthermore, econometric estimates appear highly
sensitive to the set of corrections that one actually makes (Boskin
[1986]).
Second, completely aside from issues about the deficit, it is not
at all clear that economists have yet devised satisfactory models for
aggregate variables, including consumption and interest rates (see for
example Hayashi's [1985] discussion of aggregate consumption
relationships). To the extent one mispecifies the relationship of
interest,estimates of fiscal effects may behighly unreliable, being
contaminatedby biases of unknown direction andmagnitude. Evidence
thatappears to reject some hypothesis about deficits may in fact simply—36—
reject the underlying model.
Third, it is important to distinguish between expected and
unexpected movements of explanatory variables. Indeed, under the
stochastic permanent income hypothesis, only unexpected changes matter.
Accordingly, if consumers anticipated historical movements in the
deficit perfectly, then we might well find no empirical relationship
between deficits and concurrent economic activity, even though real
activity would have been much different had the government followed some
alternative deficit policy.12/
One method cf distinghishing the effects of unexpected changes in
the deficit is to model the evolution of deficits statistically, and
relate deficit innovations to consumption innovations (i.e. run VAR's,
and employ cross—equation restrictions implied by rational expectations).
This procedure is valid only if consumers form expectations by the same
statistical model used by the econometrician. In practice, VAR models
are very parsimonious, and omit a tremendous amount of information, so
that a portion of the deficit "innovation" may be expected. This would
create serious biases in favor of Ricardian equivaience..?2'
I strongly suspect that VAR models omit important institutional
information, which individuals actually use to form their expectations.
Each year, a variety of organizations (including the Council of Economic
Advisors and the Congressional Budget Office) make well—publicized
forecasts of deficits and spending. These forecasts are presumably
based upon current knowledge of legislative plans and programs, in
addition to recent economic performance. I conjecture that such—37-.
forecastsare highly correlated with the prediction error from simple
VARmodels.
I investigated this hypothesis by estimating some simple VAR
processes for deficits, government expenditures (federal, state,and
local spending on goods and services), and net national product (all in
real per capita terms.) using annual data obtained from the Federal
Reserve data tank. In one specification, I included three lagged values
of each variable; in the other, I included five lags. I estimated both
models for the sample period 1956 to 1984, using data for years prior to
1956 to accomodate the lag structure. I then reestimated these models,
adding to each equation the forecast of deficits and government spending
published in the Economic Report of the President, beginning in 1956.
WhileI suspect that these forecasts may in some cases have been shaped
asmuch by politics as by the desire for accuracy, my purpose was merely
to determine whether institutionally based forecasts would enter
significantly.
While the forecast variables did not enter into the equations for
income and government spending with statistically significant
coefficients, the forecasted deficit showed up quite strongly in the
deficit equations. Specifically, thecoefficientswere 1.01witha t—
stat of 5.11, and 0.92 with a t—stat of 3.92 for the three and five lag
models, respectively. These coefficients suggest that the VARmodels
entirely ignore the marginal information incorporated in the
institutional forecasts. In addition, this information accounted for a
high fraction of the residual variation: the addition of the forecast—38—
variables raised the R2's is the deficit equations from 0.900 to 0.959,
and from 0.940 to 0.974 for the three and five lag models, respectively.
The important point here is not simply that one can explain part
of the VAR forecast error through the addition of variables——certainly,
this is almost always the case. Rather, my results suggest that more
than half of the VAR error is explainable by information that
individuals almost certainly use when forming expectations. While these
calculations do not necessarily establish that more complicated VAR
models (using perhaps more variables, more lags, and quarterly, or
monthly data) face similar problems, I take them to be strongly
suggestive.
Fourth, the levels of explanatory variables, as well as the
innovations in these variables, convey an amalgum of information about
future events. Current deficits (or innovations in the deficit) may be
correlated with future income or government spending. Realizing this,
consumersmay change spending today in response to current deficit
policy, but not because of thedeficit.fl'
Fifth, endogeneity is a severeproblem. Deficits, government
spending,consumption, income, and interest ratesmay allbe determined
simultaneously. While some authorshave employed instrumental
variables,the exogeneity of their instruments is highly questionable.
Sixth, it is very difficult to distinguish between the effectsof
differentfiscal policy variables. Most obviously, until very recently
governmentspending and deficits moved together very closely. This
aside, there is a more subtle problem concerning identification. We are—39—
generallyconcerned withfivefiscal policy variables: government
spending, transfers, taxes, deficits, and debt. Each hasanindependent
effect on economic activity. Yet the first four variables plus interest
on the debt sum to zero. Typically, one deals with this problem by
assuming that, since taxes decrease disposable income, the tax
coefficient equals the negative of the income coefficient. But this
assumption is valid only when taxes are non—distortionary. Recall that
a rise in deficits with spending constant maywellimply a fall In
currentcapital income taxes, so saving may rise even though deficits
themselvesactually stimulate consumption. To identify thesemodels
properly,we therefore need data on effective marginal taxrates,
especiallyfor capital income. Unfortunately,movements in marginal tax
rates mayfollow movements in revenue rather closely, making
identification difficult. Furthermore, measurement of effective tax
rateson capital income is both complex and controversial (see e.g. King
and Fullerton [1984]). It would be extremely difficult to obtain a
reliable series.
Seventh, no existing study has attempted to measure the relation-
ship between the effects of deficits and thelengthof the associated
payback period. Poterba and Summers [1986] argue thatdeficits have
actuallybeen paid off rather quickly during the twentieth century. If
so, evidence from this century only bears on deficit policies where
rapid payback is envisioned. Since the current fiscal experience is
extremely atypical, it Is not at all clear that the historical pattern
will persist, and it is even less clear that the average taxpayer—40—
expects it to persist. It is therefore extremely dangerous to draw
inferences from U.S. time series about the effects of current deficit
policy, or any other policy which involves the extended deferral of
taxes.
Eighth, it maybeextremely difficult, if not impossible, to
distinguish between interesting hypotheses given the level of
macroeconomic noise. Recall the discussion of section 2: when the
intergenerational linkage hypothesis is violated, the marginal
propensityto consume out of temporary deficits may be only five cents
on the dollar. Since this short run effect is so small, we may have
difficulty picking it up in the data, despite the existenceof enormous
longrun effects. Indeed, it may be hard to distinguish between zero,
five cents, and twenty five cents on the dollar (the latter being the
hypothesized effect in a world where some consumers are liquidity
constrained).
4.2.Studies of real variables
4.2.1.Consumption functionstudies
Table1 summarizes the methodologies and results of studies that
estimate aggregate consumption functions in order to assess the real
impact of deficits. A cursory reading of these papers suggests that
variousauthors have reached markedly different conclusions through
essentially similar analyses of U.S. time series data. I begin this
subsection by arguing that these differences are largely illusory.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ofdeficits stimulates between $0.20 and $0.50 of current consumer
spending.
Apparent differences in results caninmost cases be traced to
different formulations of thenullhypothesis. A number of authors set










whereC is consumption, Y is national income, T is tax revenues, G
is government spending, D is debt, W is private wealth, r is the
interest rate, X is a vector of other exogenous variables, and is a
stochastic error term (so that Y —Tis disposable income, and T —G
—rDis government surplus). The natural null hypothesis for this
specification is a2 =0——the alternative is the so—called "tax
discounting hypothesis," whichholdsthatconsumersat least partially







(i.e.they use gross income, rather than net income). For equation (2),
the naturalnullhypothesis is 2 =0,which corresponds to pure
Ricardian equivalence.
Thehypothesis that a20 is certainly a straw man——few people
believethat allconsumers are completely myopic. Rather than test
polarviews, one should be ocncerned with quantifying the effects of
deficits on current consumption. In this spirit, It is useful to note—42—
that (1)and (2) are "almost" the same. Specifically, if the interest
rate is time invariant, then one obtain (2) from (1) through a linear
transformation of variables. The coefficients and error terms are then






—ra1,p5= a5, =a,and =e;a2 =0 =
representsthe pure Keynesian view, a2 =a1(2= 0)represents perfect
Ricardian equivalence, and a1 —a2(p3)
measuresthe effect on current
consumption of a $1 tax—for—deficit swap.
Ricardianadvocates have objected to this interpretationof
a1 —a2
ontwo grounds. First, they claim that since government
surplusis more variable than disposable income, one would expect to
find a2 < a (see e.g. Tanner [1978]). Yet this is plainly false.
Under the Ricardian view, variability of the surplus has no effect on
consumption, so in specification (2) one must estimate p2= 0
(equivalently, a2 =a1).
In terms of equation (1), a2 =a1is required
to purge disposable income of the spurious tax component (a3and
a4
will adjust accordingly). Indeed, under the Keynesian view, high




understates the effect of deficits.
Second, they argue that if one measures Yt as current income rather
than permanent income, one nay well find * 0 simplybecause
government surplushelps to predict permanent income. Indeed, if
consumption does depend upon permanent income and if current income and
taxes move procyclically, then one would expect to find p2<0
(a2 < a1). However, many authors include cyclicalvariables in ——it—43—
isthen not at all clear that the partial correlation between permanent
income and taxes is negative. Other authors use cyclically adjusted
measures of deficits. In these cases, the direction and significanceof
the resulting bias is not at all obvious.
With this observation in mind, I now turn to specific studies.
The collumn labelled "a" under the heading "Deficit Effects" contains
results based upon specifications that resemble equation (1). Although
we are ultimately interested in the magnitude of a2 —a1,I report
estimatesof a2for two reasons. First, it is often difficult to
infer from thesestudies.' Second, even ifonehad anestimate of
a1,itwouldbe impossible to calculate a standard error for the
differencein the absence of information about correlations between
parameter estimates. I will simply note that in most cases,the
estimated coefficient ofcurrent disposableincome is at least 0.6 or
0.7, evenwhenone includes a lagged income variable. Since the long
run marginal propensity to consume is probably more on the orderof 0.8
or 0.9, one should regard 0.6 or 0.7 as lower bounds for a1.
Inspection of the a2 collumn reveals that most estimates tend to
cluster around 0.25. The highest is 0.29, and there are a number of
estimates that are substantially lower. In addition, most of these
coefficients are estimated fairly precisely——standard errors tend to be
in the neighborhood of 0.1. Accordingly, the evidence uniformly
supports the view that a $1 deficit—for—taxes swap raises consumption by
at least $0.40 to 0.50, and one can be extremely confident that the
estimated effect exceeds $0.10 to0.202￿/—44—
Inspectionof the —2collumnreveals a somewhat more
conservative picture. The median estimate is around 0.2, indicating
that a $1 deficit—for—taxes swap raises consumption by about $0.20. The
range of estimates is, however, quite large. Thelow estimates come
exclusively from three studies: Kormendi [1983], Seater and Mariano
[1985], and Evans [1985]. In the last two cases, the corresponding
standard errors are so large that any reasonable confidence interval
subsumes every hypothesis ranging from pure Keynesianism to pure
Ricardianismr! Kormendi's [1983] estimates are far more precise, but
even in this case reasonable confidence intervals do notrule out the
kind of small positive wealth effects that would be associated with
failure of the intergenerational linkage hypothesis. Note that the
other coefficients in this collumn consistently indicate that deficits
havesignificant real effects, and in many cases the estimate is quite
precise. Two studies merit further comment. Since Reid[1985] employs
multi—yearfull cycle avenges, the transitory components of his
v'ric.ases are presumably smaller than in other studies. It istherefore
noteworthy that he obtains relatively large deficit coefficients.
Boskin's [1985] estimates, which are based upon improved measures of the
deficit (including cyclical corrections), also imply large real effects.
Table 1 also contains a collumn labelled "Debt Effect." To
evaluate these coefficients, one should compare them to marginal
propensities to consume out of other forms of privatewealth..￿! Various
studies place this propensity around 0.03 to 0.05. Notethat Tanner
[1970], Yawitz and Meyer [1976], Feldstein [1982a], Seater[1982],—45—
SeaterandMariano [1985], Boskin [1985] and Modigliani and Sterling
[1986] all produce estimates in this range, many of which arequite
precise. This supports the view thatgovernmentbonds are net
wealth../ Several studies, including Tanner [1979], Seater [1982], and
Evans [1985] produce very small or even negative coefficients, but in
eachcase the estimated standard error is very large, and any reasonable
confidence interval subsumesevery conceivable hypothesis ranging from
pureRicardianismto pure Keynesianism. Only Kormendi's [1983] results
allowone to reject the hypothesis that asubstantial fraction of
governmentbonds is net wealth.
SinceKormendi stands alonein finding support for the Ricardian
view,his work deserves further comment. It is noteworthy that other
aspects of hisresultsare extremely peculiar (e.g. he finds that the
long runmarginalpropensityto consumeout of income is around 0.3),
andindicative of potentially severe mispecification. Furthermore,his
findingsdo not appear tobe very robust either with respect to the
sample period, or with respect toplausiblealternative specifications
(see Barth, Iden, and Russek [1984—85, 1986], Modigliani and Sterling
[1986], and Kormendi and Meguire [1986] for a response).
Note thatthepreponderance ofstudiesin Table IemployOLS (see
the colluinn labelled "Technique"). Failure totreatpotential
endogeneity is a serious omission. Shocks toconsumptionmay be
correlated with shocks toincome,which in turn raisetax revenues
(lowerdeficits). ThUS, there is a natural bias in favor of Ricardian
equivalence, even in a Keynesian world. Although Feldstein [1982a] and—46—
SeaterandMariano [1985] employ instrumental variables, the validity of
theirinstruments is highly questionable.1/
Table 1 also contains a partial listing of ?tkey omitted
variables.'t! A number of studies fail to include either a measure of
governmentdeficits or government debt. Such studies are naturally less
informative, and tend to confound the effects of debtsand deficits,
which are correlated. Others omit a measure of government spending.
Since deficits are highly correlated with spending, and since government
consumption appears to be a substitute for private consumption
(Kormendi [1983], Aschauer [1985], Kormendi, L.aHaye, and Meguire
[1986]), this creates a bias in favor of Ricardian equivalence.Several
other studies (Evans [1985], Boskin [1985], Modiglianiand Sterling
[1986]) include government spending, but impose the potentially spurious
restriction that government spending is neither a substitute nor a
complement for private consumption. In some cases, privatewealth is
omitted. Yawitz and Meyer [1976] show that this may bias estimatesof
the deficit effect downwards. In addition, privatewealth is also
almost certainly correlated with government debt. Finally,all studies
(with the exception of Seater and Mariano [1985])exclude measures of
marginal tax rates. I emphasized the importanceof controlling for tax
rates in subsection 4.1. Indeed, Seater andMariano's finding that
personal tax rates enter significantly corroboratesthis view.
Unfortunately, they do not include corporate tax rates,which are
perhaps the most critical determinants ofeffective levies on capital
income(see King and Fullerton [1984]).—47—
Severalpapershave documentedthe sensitivity of certainresults
tothe redefinition of certain variables (see e.g. Yawitz and Meyer
[1976], Buiter and Tobin [1979], Seater and Mariano [1985], Boskin
[1985],Barth,Iden, and Russek [1984—85, 1986], and Modigliani and
Sterling [1986]), as well as to the choice of sample period (see e.g.
Barth, Iden, and Russek [1984—85, 1986] or Tanner [1978]). The atypical
nature of war years is particularly evident, and calls into serious
question studies which focus on wartime periods (e.g. Evans [1985]).
In addition to the studies listed above, there is also a
literature which estimates the relationship between aggregate social
security wealth and consumption (see e.g. Feldstein [1974], Munnell
[1974], Barro [1978], and Darby [1979]). These studies are subject to
the general criticisms notedinsection 4.1. In addition, they are of
limitedinterest because the critical variable, aggregate social
security wealth, is nearly impossibleto measure. Extreme sensitivity
of estimates to themethod of constructing this variable is evident in
papersby Barro [1978], Leimer and Lesnoy [1982], and Feldstein
[1982b]. Auerbach and Kotlikoff [1983] have also conducted simulations
which suggest that macro estimates of social security's impact on
consumption are likely to be highly unstable. Little weight should be
attachedto these studies.
4.2.2.Consumption Euler equation studies
Thereis a close relationship between theRicardianequivalence
proposition and thestochasticpermanent income hypothesis. This
observation suggests thatitmay bepossibleto design more powerful—48—
tests of the Ricardian view by employing a consumption Euler equation
approach. Yet this approach has important limitations.
Tests of the Euler equation specification are generally
unfavorabletothe stochastic permanent income model of aggregate
consumption(seeHayashi [1985]). Yet this finding may reflect factors
that have nothing to do with Ricardian equivalence (e.g.failure of
conditions for valid aggregation). Furthermore, even if thesefactors
were related to Ricardian assumptions, onewould learn very little: as
long as the Euler equation is mispecified, one cannot useit to measure
the effects of deficits (a different specification, based upon some
alternative behavioral model, would be called for).
Failure to reject the Euler equation restrictions is, in the
current context, also uniformative. Ricardian equivalence mayfail for
reasons that do not invalidate this specification (e.g. consumersplan
consumption and saving rationally, but are myopic aboutthe link between
current deficits and future taxes). In addition, it isdifficult to
gauge the power of such tests againstinteresting alternatives (failure
to reject may result from imprecision). Nevertheless, inthis case one
could in principle measure the effects of government borrowing by
including a measure of the current deficit innovation.
Relatively few studies of deficits have adopted this approach.
Aschauer [1985] estimates a consumption Euler equation using quarterly
U.S. data (1948—81), and finds that lagged values ofdeficits are
correlated with the consumption innovation. Rather than rejecteither
Ricardian equivalence or the behavioral specification, heattributes-49—
thisto two factors: first, deficits are correlated with government
spending, and second, government spending is substitutable for private
consumption. He then tests (and does not reject) the hypothesis that
lagged deficits matter only insofar as they are used to form
expectations about government spending. Aschauer claims that his
evidence jointly supports the stochastic permanent income hypothesis,
rational expectations, and Ricardian equivalence. I take this support
to be extremely weak at best, for three reasons. First, if consumers
are rational about consumption but myopic about the link between taxes
and deficits, or if the intergenerational linkage hypothesis is invalid,
one would find exactly this pattern, despite the failure of Ricardian
equivalance. Past deficits would be uncorrelated with Euler equation
errorsexcept insofar as they helped to predict government consumption
(a component of total consumption). Nevertheless, unanticipated changes
in the deficit would still have an independent effect on current
consumption. Aschauer does not test for this. Second, the Euler
equationspecification might still fail other testsfor reasons bearing
onthe validity of Ricardian equivalence. Third,Aschauer does not
discussthe power of his test against particular alternatives. It is
possible that one would also be unable to reject the hypothesis that
lagged deficits have very large effects on the current consumption
innovation,independent of their role in predicting government spending.
Poterba and Summers [1986] also estimate a consumption Euler
equation using quarterlyU.S. data (1970—86). They include a tax
abatement variable, whichreflects the currentyear impact of tax cuts—50—
enactedinto law during previous years. The coefficient of this
variable is very large, but estimated imprecisely. Furthermore, since
the abatement variable belongs to each consumer's lagged information
set, Poterba and Summers effectively reject their Euler equation
specification on the basis of an orthogonality test. This obscures the
interpretationof the tax abatementcoefficient.
Itis also obvious from inspection of their tables that Poterba
and Summers' results are driven by recent experience——during the 8Ots
deficitshave been high and saving low. While this could be explained
by rising expectations, the authors argue that forecasts of income and
GNP growth during this period looked relatively bad. Yet econometric
forecasts need not reflect consumer expectations. In particular, much
evidence suggests that President Reagan has inspired public confidence.2/
4.2.3. Studies of Aggregate Demand and GNP
Eisner and Pieper [1984, 1986] and Boskiri [1986] estimate reduced
form macro models to measure the effects of deficits on the size and
composition of GNP. Unfortunately, there is no compelling a priori
reason for excluding variables in any reduced form equation, so it is
hard to distinguish cause and effect. In my view, this evidence simply
describes correlations without permitting a behavioral interpretation.
The results of such studies are at very best suggestive of the
possibility that deficits might have real effects.—51—
4.3 Studiesofnominal variables
4.3.1.Interest rates
Common wisdom holds that deficits raise interest rates. Economic
theory suggests that this might occur for two reasons. First, if
deficits depress saving, then interest rates must rise to bringsaving
and investment back into balance. Second, if deficits stimulate
aggregate demand, then the transactions demand for money may rise. With
a fixed stock of money, higher interest rates are necessary to choke off
the excess desire for liquidity. Since both effects can occur only if
individuals perceive government bonds to be net wealth, these
observations suggest a test of the Ricardian hypothesis.
The value of this test depends to a very large extentupon one's
view of international capital markets. If international capital flows
equalize interest rates across countries, then U.S. deficits cannot
sustain domestic interest rates in excess of world rates. Work by
Feldstein and Horioka [1980] and Harberger [1978] has spawned a
substantial literature which studies the issues of capital mobility and
interest rate equalization. A detailed discussion of this work would
carry me much too far afield. Instead, I simply note that one cannot
distinguish between the Ricardian equivalence and perfect capital
markets hypotheses on the basis of reduced form relationships between
government borrowing and interest rates.
There are nevertheless a very large number of studies that
estimate such relationships. The Congressional Budget Office [1987] has
recently summarized the methods and results of some two dozen studies.—52—
The evidence is extremely mixed. Rather thanreiterate this summary, I
will organize my discussion around the major problems encountered by
analyses of interest rates, and I will focus primarily upon recent
papers thatmakesome attempt to overcome these problems (Dwyer [1982],
Evans [1985,1986a, 1986b, 1986c, 1987], Plosser [1982, 1986], and
Feldstein [1986b]).
It is important to emphasize that all of the issues raised in
subsection 4.1 are directly relevant in thecurrentcontext. Two of
thesemerit further elaboration.
First,a number of papers employ very specific models of interest
rate determination. Studies by Plosser [1982, 1986] and Evans [1986a,
1986b, 1986c, 1987] invoke the efficient markets hypothesis, and employ
restrictive assumptions about the term structure, such as time and
maturity invariant risk premia. One must always bear in mind that these
studiestest Ricardian equivalence jointly with these strong maintained
hypotheses.
Itis particularly interesting to note that most studies employing
highly restrictive models of interest rate determination find a
significantnegative relationship betweendeficitsand interest rates.
Oneexplanationis that,by introducing uncertainty, deficits crowd—in
investment.For reasons mentioned in section 2, I regard this theory as
far—fetched. This leaves twopossibilities.First, reductionsin
marginalcapital income taxratesnay stimulate saving in the short
run. While this explanation may account for historical experience, it
rendersthe evidence uniformative for policy purposes——deficits—53—
resultingfrom cuts in labor income taxes or inframarginal capital
income taxes might well significantly stimulate currentconsumption.
Second,restrictive interest rate modelsmay simply yield spurious
result../ In eithercase, theevidenceis of little relevance.
Second, no study provides a fully satisfactory treatment of
information and expectations. Feldstein [1986b] hasemphasizedthat
thatinterestratesareprobably much more responsive to expected
deficits, than to either current deficits or outstanding debt. Yet it
is not at all clear thatcurrentdeficits, or innovations in current
deficits,are more highly correlated with future deficits than are other
measuresofcurrent economic activity orfiscal policy. Likewise,
current deficits may be highly correlated with the future values of
other variables. Suppose, for example, that current deficitsare
generallyfollowed by budget—balancing cutsingovernment spending.
Since temporary spending tends toraise interest rates (see e.g. Barro
[1986]),current deficits might then be inversely correlated with long
term rates2i
Severalauthors havemade someeffort to cope with these
difficulties. Feldstein [1986b] and Plosser [1986] both include
measures of expected future budget deficits in various interest rate
specifications. The measurement of these expectations is, ofcourse,
problematic, and undoubtably subject to serious error (see section
4.1). In addition, these authors fail to include measures of
expectations about other variables, including government spending,
output, and prices; the preceding remarks suggest thatomittedand—54-.
includedvariables may be highly correlated.
Evans [1987] adopts a much different approach. He begins by
specifying a reduced form equation for current interest rates as a
function of lagged rates, current and lagged values of various other
variables (including policy instruments), and expected future values of
these other variables. His central assumption is that the coefficients
on all deficit variables (including expectations) should be positive.
He justifies this with reference to standard theory. He then supplements
this equation with a model of the term structure and a stochastic VAR
process describing the evolution of the other variables. Combining
these equations, he shows that a standard VAR should satisfy the
restriction that the deficit coefficients sum to a positive number. He
finds that this restriction is inconsistent with the data.
Unfortunately, Evans' derivation employs some unusually strong and
objectionable maintained hypotheses..V More fundamentally, i question
the validity of his central assumption. Evan's original reduced form
equation omits expected future interest rates. To the extent future
ratesaffect current behavior, Evanst basic equation represents a quasi—
reduced form, from which expected interest rates 1ive already been
eliminated. This dramatically alters the interpretation of all
coefficients. Suppose, for example, that some current (periodt)
policy variable raises future (period t +i)interest rates. Then
individuals will typically tend to reduce consumption in the relative
short run (periods t and t +1),in order to save more for the long
run. Current saving (period t) will therefore rise. To bring current—55—
savingand investment backintobalance, current interest rates
(period t) must then fall. Evans has simply neglected such
intertempora1 feedbacks.
Inow turn to some problems thatarespecific to the analysis of
interest rates. These problems have a common root, which is that
interestrate equations have no direct behavioral interpretation.
Rather, they are quasi—reduced forms, reflectingthe interplay of forces
whichalter the supply and demand for funds. Interest rate effects
depend upon the kind of behavioral relationshipsdiscuss in section 4.2——
these are simplybehind the scenes, shrouded by another layer of
economic noise (such as term structure relations, and international
capital flows). As a result,whenstudies of behavior and interest
ratesconflict, I aminclined tobe veryskeptical about the conclusions
ofthe latter. Along these lines, three specific points merit
discussion.
First, reduced form relationships may be highly unstable, and
unreliable as policy guides (Lucas [1976]). Ample evidence indicates
that this is the case in the currentcontext..￿J
Second, it is virtually impossible to assess the power of tests
basedupon interest rate equations. When estimating consumption
functions, one hasbotha pureRicardianand pure Keynesian benchmark.
But in the case of interest rate equations, we haveonlya Ricardian
benchmark: deficits do not alter interest rates. Sincetheempirical
model is intended to represent a reduced form rather than a behavioral
relationship, one cannot, in the absence of extensive information about—56—
various elasticities, construct a natural Keynesian benchmark. Indeed,
given the small magnitude of plausible wealth effects and the tendency
for interest ratestoequalize across countries, there is little reason
to believe that deficits should significantly raise interest rates in
the short run.
These observations lead me to conclude that interest rate studies
are intrinsically uninformative as tests of the Ricardian hypothesis./
What can we deduce from the coefficient of deficits in an empirical
relationship explaining interest rates? If it is significantly positive
(as in Feldstein [1986bJ), one might conclude that consumers perceive
some fraction of government bonds to be net wealth, but one cannot
estimate this fraction. If the coefficient is not significantly
different from zero (as in Dwyer [1982}! or most of Evans [1986a]
estimates), one cannot reject Ricardian equivalence, but one also cannot
determine whether the estimates are inconsistent with any other
conceivable hypothesis of interest. If the coefficient is significantly
negative, one has probably learned nothing at all (see above).
Third, estimated models of interest rate determination are
extremely parsimonious. It is difficult to believe that the lion's
shareofmovementsininterest ratesaredriven by perhaps three to five
explanatoryvariables. This raises thepossibility that the included
variablessimply proxy for avariety ofomitted factors. Inmost
studies, omissions of this sort undoubtably bias the coefficients of
interest..i—57—
Not all of the evidence on interest rates is based upon
econometric estimation. Barro [1986] has argued that two episodes in
British history, during which the government ran deficits for apparently
exogenous reasons, provide natural experiments by which to judge the
Ricardian hypothesis.
The first episode occurred during the 1830's. Following the
emancipation of slaves in the West Indies, the British government made
large compensatory payments to slaveholders, and financed these payments
primarily with borrowing. Barro points out that interest rates did not
rise during this period. Yet it is not at all clear that this finding
is contrary to the Keynesian view. Temporary deficits were not
associated with tax cuts, so the consumption of a myopic British tax-
payer would have been unaffected by this policy. Supposing that West
Indies slave owners were fully compensated, they too would have
maintained previous levels ofconsumption.In fact, ifallassets were
perfectsubstitutes, slaveowners would have been willing to purchase the
newly issued bonds with the compensatory payments received from the
government. Finally, the slaves themselves were wealthier after the
adoption of the policy, in thesensethattheybecomeownersof humam
capital. However, there is no reason to believe that their level of
consumption significantly increased following emancipation (see Fogel
and Engerman's [1974] analysis of slavery in the u.s.), and even if it
did, it is not obvious that the emancipated slaves would have spent a
large fraction of the increase on British goods. In short, if taxpayers
were myopic, then the only short run effect of this policy was to—58—
relabelcertaininvestment activities (spending on slaves' food,
clothing, housing) as consumption activities.
The second episode occurred in 1909, when a political deadlock
lead to a one year lapse in the government's authority to collect
certain revenues. This created a deficit equal to 1.5% of trend GNP,
most of which was paid off in the following year. Barro finds no
evidence of abnormally high interest rates over the relevant period.
Yet this is hardly surprising, for two reasons. First, it was evidently
well understood that the revenue shortfall was extremely temporary in
nature. Certainly, no taxpayer could have anticipated significant
intergenerational transfers. Most economists would concede the
plausibility of approximate Ricardian equivalence under such extremely
special circumstances. Second, it is not at all clear thattheeffects
of this policy should have been detectable. Supposing that20%of the
population was liquidity constrained, one would have expected aggregate
consumption in 1909 to have risen by 0.3% of GNP. Given reasonable
levels of aggregate noise, it would be difficult to distinguish between
the presence or absence of this effect using data on consumption, let
alone from interest rates.
4.3.2. Other variables
A small number of studies have examined the link between deficits
and exchange rates (Hooper [1985], Hutchinson and Throop [1985], Evans
[1986d], Feldstein [1986c]). Conventional reasoning holds that, by
raising domestic interest rates, deficits lead to inflows of foreign
capital. International account belance requires offsetting inflows of—59—
goods.Accordingly, the value of the domestic currency must rise in
order to stimulate imports and discourage exports.
Empirical evidence on this point is mixed, with Feldstein and
Evans bracketting the available estimates. This is hardly surprising:
sincethe link between interest rates and exchange rates has nothing to
do with Ricardian equivalence, analysis of exchange rates merely adds a
layer of noise to the interest rate relationship. Accordingly, when
Feldsteinuses the same methodology as in his interest rate study, he
reaches the same conclusions (similarly for Evans). If anything,
estimation of exchange rate relationships is more problemmatic, in that
one must work with relatively little data (the U.S. floated thedollar
in 1973), and worry about a larger number of explanatory variables
(those describing the economic environment of each trading partner).
Papers by Dwyer [1982], King and Plosser [1985], and Protopapadakis
and Siegel [1984] study the relationship between deficits and inflation.
According to standard theory, deficits should accelerate inflation by
stimulating aggregate demand. Prior to the 1980's, there was indeed a
high correlation between deficits and inflation in the U.S. However,
this correlation was largely spurious, since constant real deficits
imply higher nominal deficits during inflationary periods (see Dwyer).
While studies tend to find little or no effect of real deficits on
inflation, most of the criticisms raised in the context of interest
rates are applicable.
Finally, Evans [1985] and Barth, Iden, and Russek [1984—85]
estimate money demand equations. Evans focuses on World War II, during-60—
whichTreasury bill rateswerepegged, and finds noevidenceto support
thetraditional view; Barth Iden, and Russek modify a money demand
equation originally estimated by Hafer and Hem [1984] by including a
measure of deficits, and find thatgovernmentborrowing significantly
stimulatesmoney demand. In addition tomost of the problems discussed
above,these studies may also confound supply and demand effects.
Furthermore, since the real stock of money depends upon the price level,
estimates also reflect the link between deficits and inflation.
4.4.Snry
While attempts to measure the effects of deficits directly may
well face insuperable difficulties, they do supply one more piece of the
overall picture. A succession of studies have established the existence
of a robust short run relationship between deficits and aggregate
consumption. While there are many potential explanations for this
pattern,it is at very least consistent with the traditional Keynesian
view.Results for interest ratesare mixed,and considerably more
difficult to interpret. Thus, while time series evidence weighs against
Ricardian equivalence, it does not by itselftip the scales. However,
inthe context of theoretical reasoning and behavioral analyses, a
coherent picture emerges in which the Ricardian outcome appears
relatively unlikely.
Recent experience confirms this evaluation: during the 80's,
deficits and interest rates rose dramatically, while savings rates
plumetted (see Poterba and Summers [1986] or Feldstein [1986b] for
discussions). This period was relatively unique in U.S.history,in—61—
that largedeficits resulted from declines in net revenue, rather than
temporaryincreases in government spending, so thatitpresents us with
a fairly clean experiment. This interpretation of the 80's is, of
course,controversial, and formal statistical analyses have produced
conflictingresults (compare Evans [1985, 1986b] with Feldstein
{1986b]).One key issue in this controversy concerns timing: when
exactlydid taxpayers begin to anticipate large deficits? Itend to
believethat changes in expectations were approximately coincident with
movements in interest rates and savings (indeed, more recently real
interest rates and deficit projections have fallen together, although
thedirection of causality is perhaps not clear). Since this issue is
extremely difficult to resolve, we are likely to learn more from longer
term movements in deficits, than from very short term movements. I am
therefore particularly struck by the comparison of the 80's with earlier
periods. There is no question whatsoever that expected deficits,
interest rates, and consumption have all on average been significantly
highersince 1982 thanin, for example, the 70's. While this is
conceivablyattributable to spurious factors(see subsection 4.2), the
comparisonis highly suggestive.
5.Direct Evidence:International Comparisons
As an alternative toanalyzing timeseriesdata for individual
countries, one could also measure the effects of government borrowing
through international comparisons. This approach offers certain natural
advantages.First, there is much more independent movement of deficits—62—
arid governmentspending across countries, than there is within
countries. Second, by averaging over substantial periods of time, one
can hope to measure the more permanent components of each variable, and
thereby minimize problems arising from the informational and
expectational issues discussed in section 4.1. In addition, results
based on multiperiod averages may provide some clue as to the long run
effects of sustained deficits. Finally, if one is willing to forego
multi—year averages and pool time—series cross—section data, one can
greatly expand the number of available observations.
On the other hand, cross—country comparisons hardly provide a
panacea. Many of the issues described in section 4applyequally well
tointernational data. In addition, several problems become much more
serious. First, the relevant variables maybe measured differently (or
mismeasureddifferently) indifferent countries.￿Z/ Second, countries
differ structurally in terms of institutions, and the population of each
country may behave somewhat idiosynchratically. Third, deficits may
move for reasons unrelated to the Ricardian hypothesis (e.g. shocks to
oil prices)...￿! Finally, practical considerations may seriously limit the
number of observations available for analysis.
It is difficult to weigh the relative importance of these
advantages and disadvantages a priori. Evidence from cross—country
comparisons is therefore neither definitive nor irrelevant——it simply
adds one more piece to the overall picture.—63—
5.1. SocIalSecurity
To date, relatively few studies have used datafrom international
cross—sections to address issues raised in the Ricardiandebate. Almost
all of the existing work, including papers by Feldstein[1977, 1980],
Barro and MacDonald [1979], Kopitz and Gotur [1979],and Modigliani and
Sterling [1983], analyzes the effect of social security onprivate
saving or consumption. Generally, these studiesdescribe regressions of
saving or expenditure on age distribution variables,retirement
variables, income growth, and a measure of social securitybenefits or
entitlements
In attempting to reconcile the mixed findings that emergefrom
these studies, Modigliani and Sterling point out thatsocial security
has an indirect effect on saving through its impact onretirement.
Furthermore, this works to offset the direct effect.Since Feldstein
andModigliafli--Sterling control for retirement, they tend tofind a
positiverelationship between social security and spending,while Barro—
MacDonald and Kopitz—Gotur, who fail to control for retirement,find
littleorno relationship. Under this view, social securityhas little
effect on aggregate capital accumulation, but for reasonsentirely
unrelatedto Ricardian equivalence. However, this explanation provides
onlya partial reconciliation of the existing results,in that neither
Barro—MacDoflald'Snor Modigliani—Sterlifl&s findings are robust.Given
thedifficulty of measuring social security wealth, particularlyin a
way that is comparable across countries,and given the degree of
uncertainty involved in selecting a specificationthat adequately allows—64—
forvarious socio—economic and demographic differences between
countries, sensitivity to variable definitions and changes in functional
specification isextremely disturbing. The evidence simply does not
justify any strong inferences.
5.2. Deficits
Inthis section, I present new evidence on the relationship
betweengovernment borrowing and private consumption. The novel aspect
of my analysis is that it isbased upon international comparisons,
ratherthan aggregate time series. Work in progress by Modigliani,
Mason, and Sterling [1986] also tests the Ricardian hypothesis with
cross—country data. Their preliminary results, based upon an
alternative specification and substantially different sample,
corroborate my findings.
The specifications estimated below are based upon equation (2),
which I modify in the following ways. First, I drop the intercept term
(i.e. assume that utility is homethetic), and divide both sides of the
equation by Y to adjust for heteroskedasticity. This obviates the
need to convert quantities to per capita figures, or to a common
currency through exchange rates. Second, due to the lack of data,I
omit W from the equation entirelyi9! Third, I add measures of real
income growth (YG) and population growth (PG). These variables may
capture at least some of the socio—economic factors that create
international variation in propensities to consume. My final empirical
specification is therefore:—65—
(3) dY = + + 3G/Y+ + + 7PG+
(whereDEF is the deficit).
I estimate equation (3) using data obtained from the IMF's
International Financial Statistics. I measure thevariableY as gross
domestic product, C as private consumption expenditure, D as total
outstandinggovernment debt41i and G as current government consumption,
which is calculated in the mannerprescribedby the United Nation's
systemof Standard National Accounts4/ I use two differentmeasures of
DEF.One is the current net deficit (surplus) of theconsolidated
central government. For the other measure, I adjust the current deficit
forinflationary erosion of the real value of outstanding government
debt. I label this second measure ADEF. I measure YG as the log of the
ratio of current to lagged real GDP; similarly, PG is the log of the
ratioof current to lagged population.
Data quality is asevere problem. Manyof the governmental
variables for International Financial Statistics are evidently
constructed internally by the IMF, and are considered highly
unreliable.Accordingly, one should think of this exercise as a
suggestive exploration. However, one should also bear in mind that
errors in measuring of the fiscal variables should bias my findings in
favor of the Ricardian hypothesis.
For many countries, one or more critical variables aresimply
unavailable. In other cases, data are missing in particular years. The
mosttroublesome variable is outstanding government debt; the
availability of this variable largely dictates sample selection. I—66—
foundthat byfocusing on the twelve year period from 1972 to 1983, I
could assemble a relativelycomplete data setbased on a reasonably
largesample of countries.The sizes of thesample usedbelowdepend
uponwhether or not I insist on includingDin the empirical specifi-
cation. While the total sample consists of 39countries4/only 26 have
adequateinformation ongovernment debt.
Inan effort to identify robust empirical relationships,Ihave
analyzedthese data ina number of different ways. The firstapproach
is to take twelve year averages for each country, and run simple cross—
sectionalregressions. The primary advantage of this approach is that
itallows me to relatelongrunlevelsof the explanatory variables to
long runprivateconsumption. Transitory movements,which may carry
spuriousinformation or alter expectations in unknown ways, become
significantlyless important. As mentioned above, data on certain
countries is not quite complete. In suchcases, I base averageson the
yearsfor which all relevant variables are available. This may
introduce a small amount of heteroskedasticity.
Table 2 contains the results of simple cross—sectional
regressions. Equation 2.1 corresponds to the basic empirical
specification,where DEF (unadjusted)is usedas a measure of government
deficits.Note that the coefficient of deficits is extremely large, and
in fact exceeds the marginal propensity to consume. Although this
coefficient is not estimated very precisely, it does differ from zero at
the 10% level of confidence. Note also that the coefficient of debt is
negative. However, all interesting hypotheses essentially lie withinTable 2: Regression Results for Twelve Year Averages
Variable
EquationNumber
2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4
Intercept 0.802 0.737 0.822 0.847





CR —1.28 —0.906 —1.41 —1.44
(0.26) (0.198) (0.29) (0.29)
YG —0.047 —0.318 —0.464 —0.553
(0.675) (0.514) (0.750) (0.746)
pG —0.686 0.783 —0.112 —0.04
(1.10) (0.934) (1.14) (1.14)
D —0.074 0.080
(0.127) (0.078)
Number of 26 39 26 26
Countries
0.634 0.464 0.609 0.589—67—
onestandard deviation of the point estimate. The marginal propensity
to consume from income is both reasonable (0.8) and precisely
estimated. The estimates also suggest that government spending is a
substitute for private consumption, in that a one dollar increase in
tax—financed spending causes consumption to fall by $1.28. The
coefficients of both YG and PG are insignificant.
The large standard error on the coefficient of debt suggests that
the data may not be able to distinguish between interesting hypotheses
on the basis of wealth effects. I therefore reestimate the basic
specification, omitting D (note that this does not bias the remaining
coefficients under the Ricardian view). This allows me to use the full
sample of 39countries.Results are given in equation 2.2. There are
two noteworthy changes. First, the deficit coefficient is essentially
the same as the marginal propensity to consume from income. In
addition, it is estimated much more precisely, and differs from zero at
extremely high levels of confidence. Second, the coefficient of G moves
towards the marginal propensity to consume, so that one cannot rule out
the possibility that utility is separable in public and private
consumption.
Equations 2.3 and 2.4 provide similar estimates based upon
inflation—adjusted deficits (ADEF). Estimates of the basic specifi-
cation look essentially unchanged, except that the coefficient of D now
has the expected sign (it is still insignificant). The omission of D
raises the coefficient of ADEF, as well its precision. While the
estimated coefficient is unreasonably large, sensible values lie within—68--
twostandard deviations of the point estimate.
Results based upon simple cross—sectional estimates are clearly
suspect. A parsimonious regression cannot possibly capture the richness
of socio—economic factors that create variation in saving rates across
countries. Unobserved factors that are correlated with private
extravagence(high levels of consumption) may also be associated with
public extravagence (large deficits); this nay in part explain the very
large deficit coefficients in Table 2. Differences in accounting
practicesnayalso nake international comparisons of deficit levels
problematic. -
Toaddress these considerations, I divide the 12 year sample into
two distinct six year subperiods (1972 to 1977 and 1978 to 1983), and
analyze the relationship between changes in consumption and changes in
deficits. Since this amounts to allowing for country—specific
differences in the propensity to consume out of income (i.e. fixed
effects), it should minimize biases arising from unobserved socio-
economic differences. In addition, fixed effects estimation eliminates
many problems arising from systematic differences between accounting
techniques,since results depend upon changes in variables, rather than
theirabsolute levels.
To implement this second approach, it is necessary to apply a
somewhat more demanding sample selection criterion, in that one needs
enough data to calculate a reliable average for each six year
subperiod. Accordingly, I was forced to drop three countries. All of
the remaining estimates are based upon a sample of 23 countries.—69—
Itis possible to get a feel for general patterns by looking at
the data in a relatively unprocessed form. I refer the reader to Table
3.Foreach country, I list the changeinprivate consumption, the
change in deficits, and the change in adjusted deficits between the two
six year subperiods. All values are expressed relative to concurrent
GDP. My discussion of this table will focus on adjusted deficits, but
similar conclusions follow for the unadjusted deficit variable.
Note first that for roughly two—thirds of the sample (15 of 23
countries), deficits and consumption moved in the same direction between
the two six year subperiods. This correlation is stronger in cases
where the change in deficits was large. 16 countries experienced a
change in excess of 1% of GNP; in 11 cases, deficits and consumption
moved in the same direction. Confining attention to cases in which the
change in consumption was also large (greater than 1% of GDP), we see
thatdeficitsand consumption moved together in 9of11 cases. If we
focuson countries experiencing a change in average deficits exceeding
2% of GDP, the comparable numbers are 9 of 13, and 7 of 9 countries,
respectively.By restricting attention to those countries experiencing
very large changes (more than 3% of GDP), we find that consumptionand
deficits moved together in 6 of 7 cases. Finally, deficits and
consumption moved in the same direction for every country (4of4)
experiencingboth a very large change in deficits (greater than 3%) and
a significant change in consumption (greater than 1%). Note that while
theU.S.experience is consistent with this pattern, it is by no means
egregious. In fact, given my choice of subperiods, the change in U.S.Table 3: Changes Between Six Year Subperiods
Country tC DEF ADEF
Belgium 0.037 0.053 0.057
Canada —0.002 0.018 0.016
Costa Rica —0.058 0.015 —0.020
El Salvador 0.031 0.043 0.034
Finland —0.005 0.023 0.020
France 0.025 0.015 0.008
Germany 0.014 0.008 0.006
Guatama].a 0.025 0.022 0.025
Iceland —0.024 —0.021 —0.071
India —0.026 0.023 0.021
Italy —0.004 —0.002 —0.030
Korea —0.049 0.002 0.007
Morocco —0.017 0.020 0.005
New Zealand —0.015 0.020 0.006
Norway —0.037 —0.014 —0.025
South Africa —0.031 —0.009 —0.012
Spain 0.010 0.036 0.032
Sri Lanka 0.008 0.078 0.059
Sweden —0.007 0.065 0.059
Switzerland 0.024 0.003 0.001
Thailand —0.011 0.016 0.020
United States 0.009 0.011 0.008
Venezuela 0.093 0.023 0.010—70—
deficits was not even particularly large.
While the relationship between deficits and consumption is
apparentin the rawdata, one cannot measure it by inspection of the
numbers,nor be certain thatitdoes not reflect spurious correlations.
Accordingly, I regress the change in private consumption on the changes
in eachof the dependent variables. Table 4 contains results.
Equations 4.1 to 4.4 correspondexactly to 2.1 to 2.4. Several patterns
emerge.First, the deficit coefficients are muchsmaller, generally
indicatingthat a $1 deficit—for—taxes swap would raise consumption by
$0.30 to $0.50. This confirms the view that unobserved factors are
correlated with public and private extravagence, and that this biases
simple cross—sectional regressions. However, the estimated effect is
still quite sizable. Unfortunately, the coefficients are not
statistically significant at conventional levels when debt is included
in the specification. While the coefficient of debt is now positive
regardless of whether uses adjusted or unadjusted deficits, it is still
not significantly different from zero. Exclusion of the debt variable
causesthe deficit coefficient to become significant at high levels of
confidence. Note also that the coefficients of government consumption
are now consistent with the view that utility is separable, or perhaps
even exhibits some complementarity between government and private
consumption.
As a next step, I modified equations 4.1 through 4.4 by moving
consumption in the first subperiod (lagged consumption, LC) from the












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































in the explanatory variables, and lagged consumption). I interpret the
resulting specifications as Euler equations. While changes in
explanatory variables between consecutive years certainly do not reflect
innovations, it is more reasonable to expect that changes in six year
avenges might approximate innovations to long—run levels. The
regression results are quite encouraging. The size of the deficit
coefficient increases in all specifications, and is generally
statistically significant at high levels of confidence. In addition,
when I use adjusted deficits, the t—statistic for debt rises to 1.5,
which is marginally significant. It is also noteworthy that a
regression of current consumption on lagged consumption and all lagged
explanatoryvariables suggested that thestochastic permanent income
hypothesis'orthogonalitycondition is satisfied——the F—statistic for
the hypothesis that all coefficients for lagged explanatory variables
equal zero was 1.0.
Byavenging over six year subperiods, one can examine the
relationships between movements in different variables without
sacrificing the advantages of using "long run" measures. As a final
step, I also estimated regressions based on pooled, single year, time
series cross—section data. Results are presented in Table 5. I will
begin with equation 5.1 through 5.4, which do not contain country
specific intercepts. While these estimates bear a strong resemblance to
those obtainedfrom 12 year averages, there are also some important
differences. The coefficients of deficits are large, but unlike those














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































consume from deficits and income arealmostindestinguishable in three
of fourcases.Standarderrorsin Table 5 are also much lower, owing to
the relative size of the data sample. As before, government spending
appears to be substitutable for private consumption. The debt
coefficient is positive in both 5.1 and 5.3; notethat itis
statisticallysignificant andof a reasonable magnitude in 5.3.
The inclusion of country specific intercepts somewhat alters this
picture.Not surprisingly, these estimates bear a strong resemblance to
thosebased on changes between six year subperiods. Deficits now appear
to stimulate consumption by about $0.40 On the dollar, rather than
$0.70. Once again, this effect is estimated very presicely.The
coefficientof government spending now suggests significant complemen—
tarity with private consumption. Finally, the debt coefficient is
positive in both 5.5 and 5.7; itisstatistically significant and of a
reasonable magnitude in 5.7.
Tworemarks are in order. First, these results are very strongly
pro—Keynesian and anti—Ricardian. Equation 5.7 is, in some sense, the
preferred specification, in that itincludescountry—specific
intercepts, employs a superior measure of deficits, and retains the debt
variable. This equation suggests that a $1 deficit—for—taxes swap will
increase consumption by about $0.57, and that $1 of debt raises
consumptionby $0.06. Both effects are estimated quite precisely.
Second,the robustness of these results across specifications and
estimation techniques is striking. It is particularly interesting to
note the similarity of results based upon yearly data, and multi—year—73—
averages.This suggests that one does not significantly contaminate the
estimates with transitory effects by making use of yearly variation.
However, one does obtain an enormous increase in the precision of the
estimates.
One additional puzzle merits some discussion. Throughout this
analysis, I have with few exceptions estimated the coefficient of income
growth to be negative, whereas standard life cycle theory suggests that
it should be positive. While the effect is not generally significant,
itrequiressome explanation. It is possible thatthispattern reflects
confusionof cause and effect: extravagent countries may sacrifice
growth for current consumption.
My findings are generally consistent with those of Modigliani,
Mason,and Sterling [1986]. This is particularly striking in light of
the fact thattheseauthors use a different sample and empirical
specification. Although they also employ data from the IMF's
International Financial Statistics, they focus on the period from 1960
to 1980, and use a somewhat different set of countries. Since data on
outstanding debt has only recently become available for many countries,
theylack a direct measure of debt, and their attempts to construct a
substitute measure are generally unsuccessful. However, by sacrificing
the debt variable, they are able to make use of a much large sample.
Overall,analysis of cross—country data supports the view that
government deficits stimulate private consumption. The robustness of
this conclusion with respect to alternative specifications, estimation
techniques, and samples is quite striking.—74—
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